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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Court granted certiorari on the following issues: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court as 
to the voir dire questions submitted to the jury. 
Preservation: At the Court of Appeals, this issue was addressed in 
appellees' Brief of Appellant, pp. 11-16, and Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 1-9. In the trial 
court, the issue was addressed in plaintiffs' proposed Request for Submission of a Jury 
Questionnaire and for Reasonable Follow Up Voir Dire. (R. 596-600; Exhibit 2.)1. 
However, the Court of Appeals held that submission of the requested voir dire was not 
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See Point I, infra. 
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Peterson v Kennard, 2008 UT 90, \ 8, 201 P.3d 
956. Interpretation of a Rule of Civil Procedure is a question of law. Stoddard v Smith, 21 
P.3d 546, 548 (Utah 2001). A trial court's management of jury voir dire is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Alcazar v University of Utah Hospitals, et al, 2008 UT App 222 1)9, 
188 P.3d 490, 493; Barrett v Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
1
 Plaintiffs Proposed Request for Submission of a Jury Questionnaire and for Reasonable 
Follow up Voir Dire are attached hereto as Add.Exh. 3. Perhaps because it was 
submitted as an attachment to correspondence, the document was not docketed at the time 
of its initial filing. However, defendant acknowledged receiving it (R. 436), and it was 
incorporated in part by the trial court (R. 536 # 1, 2, 9, 11, 14 and R. 599-600, # 5-9). To 
clear up the record, the plaintiffs subsequently resubmitted another copy of the document 
without objection. (R. 599-600) 
ISSUE N O . 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
overruling of Petitioners' objection to references to another case in closing argument. 
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 90, *| 8, 201 P.3d 
956. The trial court's decision to allow defense counsel to refer to the McDonald's 
coffee case in closing argument is reviewed for abuse of discretion State v. Alonzo, 932 
P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997), and State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 981 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation: In the Court of Appeals, the issue was raised in the Brief of 
Appellants, pp. 16-19, and the Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 9-12. At trial, Plaintiff 
objected on the record at the time of the prejudicial statement. (R. 695, p. 48:17-23.) 
ISSUE N O . 3: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii). 
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 90, f^ 8, 201 P.3d 
956. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law that is reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane 
v. State Tax Comm% 2006 UT 25, \ 9, 134 P.3d 1116. As the defendant's "motion in 
limine" was, in actuality, a motion for summary judgment on Mrs. Boyle's claims, 
dismissal could be granted (and affirmed) only if there was "no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party [was] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). All facts and reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, 2004 
UT App 354^(10, 101P.3d371. 
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Preservation: These issues were raised in the Court of Appeals in the 
Brief of Appellants, pp. 19-22, and Reply Brief of Appellants, pp. 12-15. In the trial 
court, the issues were raised in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion in Limine to Dismiss Plaintiff Norrine Boyle. (R. 326-355.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11: Action for consortium due to personal injury. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "injury" or injured" means a significant permanent injury 
to a person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle 
and includes the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the 
extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types 
of jobs the person performed before the injury; and 
(b) "spouse" means the legal relationship: 
(i) established between a man and a woman as 
recognized by the laws of this state; and 
(ii) existing at the time of the person's injury. 
(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 
1997, may maintain an action against the third party to recover 
for loss of consortium. 
(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the 
spouse. The statute of limitations applicable to the injured person 
shall also apply to the spouse's claim of loss of consortium. 
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made 
and joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and 
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium: 
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in 
behalf of the injured person; and 
(b) may not exist in cases where the injured person would not 
have a cause of action. 
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(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the 
injured person, shall be compared with the fault of all other 
parties, pursuant to Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823, for 
purposes of reducing or barring any recovery by the spouse for 
loss of consortium. 
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with 
any award to the injured person for general damages, may not 
exceed any applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, 
including Section 78B-3-410. 
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental 
entity is required to pay, when combined with any award to the 
injured person which a governmental entity is required to pay, 
may not exceed the liability limit for one person in any one 
occurrence under Title 63G, Chapter 7, Governmental Immunity 
Act of Utah. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. 
It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is 
made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the 
court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds 
therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at 
the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice 
him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
Plaintiff John Boyle filed a negligence action against Defendant Kerry Christensen 
on July 14, 2005, alleging that Mr. Christensen was responsible for an automobile / 
pedestrian accident on July 22, 2004 in which Mr. Boyle was injured. (R. 1-5.) Mr. 
Boyle's spouse, Norrine Boyle, was subsequently added as a plainliff, alleging loss of 
consortium. (R. 105.) 
On January 8, 2008, Defendant Christensen filed a Motion in Limine requesting 
dismissal of Norrine Boyle's Loss of Consortium claim, arguing that Mrs. Boyle's claim 
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lacked the necessary evidentiary support to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-2-11. (R. 240-316.) The trial court granted the motion by order dated May 28, 
2008. (R. 528, 532-534 (collectively attached hereto as Add.Exh. 2).) 
The defendant stipulated to liability (R. 693, p. 6:20-21), and John Boyle's claims 
for damages were tried to a jury from June 3-6, 2008. Prior to trial, both parties provided 
proposed Jury Questionnaires to the trial court. (R. 436-40 (defendant's); 596-600 
(plaintiffs, attached hereto as Add.Exh. 3.) The court took the two sets of proposed 
questions, to which neither party objected, and culled and combined them into one 
document. The court then conducted oral voir dire using the document it had created. 
The court declined to ask any of Mr. Boyle's questions designed to reveal possible juror 
biases regarding tort reform, nor was Mr. Boyle afforded an opportunity to question the 
jurors on the tort reform issues. (R. 693, pp. 25-98.) 
Later, during closing argument, Defendant Christensen's counsel, arguing that Mr. 
Boyle's compensatory damage analysis would result in an excessive verdict, stated 
"That's how we get verdicts like in the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee." (R. 695, 
p. 48:17-22.) The trial court overruled Mr. Boyle's objection that the comment was not 
supported by the evidence and was prejudicial. (Id, pp. 48:23-49:5.) 
Despite significant injuries, including a back surgery, the jury returned a verdict of 
only $62,500, including medical expenses, which included only $27,800 in non-economic 
damages. The trial court entered the Final Verdict on the Judgment June 20, 2008. (R. 
669-673.) Plaintiffs timely appealed. (R. 674-675.) The Court of Appeals affirmed (see 
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Add.Exh. 1), and the Boyles filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court 
granted. 
FACTS 
The accident and injury / Mrs. Boyle's loss-of-consortium claim 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiff John Boyle was struck by a pick-up truck while he was 
in a crosswalk in front of a Smith's grocery store. As noted above, defendant admitted 
liability for the accident. (Opinion, f 5; R. 241.) 
The accident caused a severe disc herniation and other injuries that eventually 
necessitated surgery. (R. 339-40.) Although the surgery provided some relief, it proved 
to be largely unsuccessful. As a result, Mr. Boyle has been left with permanent chronic 
pain. Since the accident, Mr. Boyle has not been able to sleep in a bed and is only able to 
get limited sleep in a recliner. His lack of sleep causes problems with everything that he 
does. It has not precluded him from working at a sedentary job, but even at that kind of 
work, it has interfered with his productiveness and precluded him from working full eight 
hour days. He is not able to perform employment with any significant physical demands 
and can no longer even carry small baskets of golf balls. Prior to the accident, Mr. Boyle 
was an accomplished golfer, and, at one point in his adult life, worked as the golf pro at a 
golf course. Now, according to Mr. Boyle, his chronic pain and lack of sleep "permeates 
everything that I do." (R. 261-62.) 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Boyle's wife of many years, Norrine, asserted a 
claim for loss of consortium. The parties did not dispute that, under Utah Code Ann. § 
30-2-11(2), the spouse of a person must show that the person was injured" by a third 
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party in order to assert a loss-of-consortium claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(2) 
(wThe spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 1997, may maintain 
an action against the third party to recover for loss of consortium."). 
"Injury" or "injured," in turn, is defined as "a significant permanent injury to a 
person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes . . . (iii) incapability 
of the person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the injury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii). Mrs. Boyle argued that the evidence presented was 
sufficient to satisfy this method of showing an injury, but the trial court disagreed, and 
dismissed her claim prior to trial. (R. 532-34.) On appeal, the parties' disagreement 
centered on the meaning of the statutory term "incapability." See pp. 25-28, infra. 
Requested voir dire on tort reform issues 
After the dismissal of Mrs. Boyle's consortium claim, Mr. Boyle's claims 
proceeded to trial. Consistent with the court's Case Management Order, Plaintiff 
submitted a written list of requested voir dire questions for potential jurors. (R. 596-600.) 
Because a substantial part of John Boyle's claims were for general damages for chronic 
pain, Mr. Boyle sought insight into the jurors' attitudes regarding general damages and 
awards for pain and suffering: 
Four of the questions were intended to solicit jurors' views on issues generally 
known as tort reform issues: 
4: What are your feelings or opinions about people who bring personal 
injury lawsuits? If supported by the evidence, could you award a large 
amount of money to the plaintiff in this case? 
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5: If you were seriously hurt or injured by the negligence of another, 
would you sue? Please explain your answer: 
6: If supported by the evidence, could you award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain • yes • no 
b. Mental anguish • yes D no 
c. The impact on a wife of partially disabling injuries to her 
husband? 
d. Future medical bills • yes D no 
If you answered NO to any of the above, please explain: 
7. Do you believe the law should impose limits on money that can 
be awarded for pain and suffering: • yes D no If YES, what do you 
believe these limitations should be? 
(R. 599; see Add.Exh. 3.); see Opinion, ^ 4 ("Mr. Boyle submitted a proposed jury 
questionnaire that included specific questions intended to elicit jurors' views regarding 
damages and tort reform"). The defendant indicated that he did not "object to the 
questionnaire submitted by plaintiffs. ." (R. 436.) 
Unlike most district court judges, it is undisputed that the trial court in this case 
did not provide counsel with any advance notice of its intentions regarding voir dire until 
it had already ruled on the parties' proposed questions by conducting the voir dire. The 
court did not, for example, provide a copy of its final list of voir dire questions for 
counsel's review before questioning the jury pool. Nor did the court ask counsel 
afterward if they wanted any other questions asked of the pool, or solicit exceptions. 
On appeal, defendant Christensen argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that 
plaintiff had failed to preserve his request for tort reform-related voir dire by not 
objecting after the trial court had conducted its voir dire. Opinion, ^ 12, 14. Appellant 
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Boyle argued that, under U.R.Civ.P. 46, a party is not required to object once a court has 
already ruled. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument or Rule 46. 
Defense counsel's reference to the "McDonald's" case 
At trial, the defense strategy centered on casting Mr. Boyle in a negative light for 
requesting a substantial amount of money for his injuries. This theme was carried too far 
in closing arguments where defense counsel compared Mr. Boyle's claim for damages to 
those made in an unrelated 1994 New Mexico case often referred to as the "McDonald's 
coffee case": 
It's a per diem analysis. How many days has it been since the accident? 
How many days for the rest of his life? And how much per day is that 
worth? That's what been done here. That's how we get verdicts like in the 
McDonald's case with a cup of coffee. 
(R. 695, p. 48:17-22) 
Mr. Boyle's counsel objected on the grounds that the statement addressed a matter 
not in evidence and was prejudicial, but the objection was overruled. (R. 695, pp. 48:17-
49:5) The jury returned a very low verdict of only $62,500, of which only $27,800 was 
awarded for general damages. 
A majority of the Court of Appeals held that, not only was it not an abuse of 
discretion to allow defense counsel to reference the "coffee case," but that such a 
reference is in fact proper. Opinion, f^ 18. Concurring in the result, Judge McHugh 
would have held that reference to the McDonald's case was improper, but that there was 
no prejudice to the plaintiff. Opinion, ffl[ 26-31. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A party's right to question prospective jurors regarding their views on tort reform 
issues has been recognized in Utah for nearly two decades. (Hence the fact that the 
defendant did not object to Mr. Boyle's proposed questions in this case.) As the Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly stated, without this type of information, a party's ability to 
intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges is materially impeded. Consequently, the 
trial court's refusal to ask any of Mr. Boyle's tort reform questions - while 
simultaneously asking injury-specific questions that aided the defendant in his peremptory 
challenges - was both contrary to Utah law and inherently prejudicial, particularly where 
the amount of damages was the only issue at trial. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling that Mr. Boyle did not preserve this issue for appeal 
because he did not object after the trial court ruled on his request is in direct conflict with 
U.R.Civ.P. 46, which expressly states that exceptions to adverse rulings need not be 
taken. In the relatively rare instance when a trial court fails to advise the parties of its 
decision regarding voir dire before conducting the voir dire, and does not elicit input 
before moving on to for-cause challenges, the issue has been preserved in the only way 
that is practicable and required under Rule 46, i.e., timely submission of the proposed 
questions. Moreover, in the absence of authority putting Mr. Boyle on notice that 
submission of the questions was insufficient preservation, the Court of Appeals should 
have considered the trial court's omission under a plain error analysis. 
Mr. Boyle was further prejudiced in closing arguments when the defendant's counsel 
compared Mr. Boyle's claim for damages to an unrelated, nationally notorious tort reform 
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case, the "McDonald's coffee case." Defendant's mention of this case - an increasingly 
common defense tactic in Utah - was patently intended to inflame jurors' prejudices 
regarding perceived excessive damage awards in personal injury cases, which was highly 
prejudicial to the plaintiff in this "damages only" lawsuit. 
Finally, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff Norrine Boyle's consortium 
claim prior to trial. The Boyles' record citations, and reasonable inferences therefrom, 
raised a question of fact as to whether Mr. Boyle was materially limited in his ability to 
perform the same type of jobs as before the accident, which is a sufficient method of 
proving an "injury" for purposes of the loss-of-consortium statute. The Court of 
Appeals' much narrower reading of the statute is an overly restrictive interpretation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE 
DISTRICT COURT AS TO THE VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
Pursuant to the Scheduling Order in place, Mr. Boyle provided the trial court with 
a proposed Request for Submission of a Jury Questionnaire and for Reasonable Follow 
Up Voir Dire which included his short, two-page, questionnaire. (R. 599-600.) Four of 
the questions were intended to solicit jurors' views on issues generally referred to as tort 
reform issues. Id. 
Although the defendant did not object to the questions, the trial court nonetheless 
did not ask any of the plaintiffs "What are your views../5 questions designed to elicit 
information for peremptory challenges. See Opinion, ffl| 10, 11. Instead, it limited its 
voir dire to "Are you biased?" questions that are designed to enable for-cause challenges. 
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Id.; see pp. 13-15, infra (cases recognizing that the latter type of questions are of little or 
no use in exercising peremptory challenges). 
The only questions that were arguably designed to elicit responses regarding 
biases were the trial court's questions 13, 14 and 15: 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you 
from being fair and impartial regarding persons who have 
personal injury disputes and who choose to resolve those 
disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal religious or other beliefs that 
would prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, 
small amount, or zero amount, if warranted and justified by 
the evidence and the law given you by the Court? 
15. Given all considerations and everything you know about this 
case so far, can you be fair, impartial, neutral, judge of the 
facts and follow 1he law as given to you by the Court? 
(R. 536;seeAdd.Exh.4.) 
Not surprisingly, prospective jurors who were asked these general questions 
answered "No, No, and Yes," without elaboration. (R. 693, pgs. 33, 39, 41, 47, 51, 55-
56, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 73, 79, 82, 84, and 89). The questions were neither designed to, 
nor did they, elicit any information about the individuals' views regarding personal injury 
lawsuits or tort reform. 
A. A party is entitled to ask jurors their views on tort-reform 
issues, and the denial of such an opportunity is inherently 
prejudicial. 
Over the past two decades, the Court of Appeals has consistently held that parties 
are entitled to seek information from prospective jurors regarding their views on tort 
reform-related issues. See Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, T|16, 204 P.3d 
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204; Alcazar v. U of U Hospitals, 2008 UT App 222, fflf 5, 19, 188 P.3d 490 (noting 
"rather direct authority" and "prior, clear precedents" establishing plaintiffs * entitlement 
to voir dire questions regarding tort reform), citing Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah 
App. 1991) and Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1993). See also, Smith v. 
Vicorp, Inc., 107 F.3d 816, 817 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Barrett for the proposition that 
"state trial courts in Utah are required to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to poll potential 
jurors for possible tort reform bias.") 
In Alcazar, the trial court declined to ask questions the plaintiffs requested in order 
to elicit jurors' potential biases regarding medical malpractice claims and tort reform. 
Instead, as in this case, the court decided to ask more general questions. Id., ffl[ 5-7. The 
jury returned a verdict finding the defendant not negligent. 
On appeal, the Alcazar court explained why the trial court's voir dire procedure 
was both erroneous and prejudicial. First, the court discussed its holding in Evans, in 
which the trial court had asked a line of general questions regarding fairness and 
impartiality that "was only effective in identifying proper for-cause challenges." Such 
narrow questioning was insufficient, this Court held: 
The trial court's questions did not allow the plaintiff an opportunity to 
know which of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform 
propaganda, totally aside from whether the prospective jurors would 
themselves admit such exposure had changed their attitudes or biased them. 
Essentially, we concluded that the trial judge's line of questions ignored the 
plaintiffs need to gather information to assist in exercising her peremptory 
challenges. 
Alcazar, 2008 UT App 222, \\2 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
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In Barrett, the Alcazar court pointed out, it had again reversed a trial court's 
refusal to ask about exposure to tort reform information, which had deprived the plaintiff 
of "information necessary both to detect actual bias and to intelligently exercise his 
peremptory challenges." Id., ^ 13, quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102 n.7. In both Evans 
and Barrett, the Alcazar court noted, the plaintiffs had not been given an opportunity to 
"determine which, if any, prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda, 
much less whether that exposure produced hidden or subconscious biases affecting the 
jurors' ability to render a fair and impartial verdict." Id. at ^ [14. 
Alcazar then observed that, under Evans and Barrett, "our inquiry does not end 
once we have established that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to ask any 
meaningful tort reform . . . questions during voir dire." Id. at ^[15. Once the 
determination has been made that a party was substantially impaired in its right to 
exercise peremptory challenges, "[w]e will reverse if, considering the totality of the 
questioning, counsel was not afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate the jurors. Id. at f l5 (internal citations to quotes omitted). 
In Alcazar, the only question the trial court asked specifically regarding tort 
reform was: "Have any of you or a close friend or relative personally formed an opinion 
either in favor or opposed to tort reform or been a member of any organization that has?" 
Id. at ]]18. As in this case, most of the other questions were designed to uncover general 
biases and prejudice. However, the trial court "allowed the potential jurors to be 
questioned as to both their experience with doctors and hospitals and any negative 
aspects of this experience." Id. Based on these facts, the Alcazar court concluded that 
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the "trial court simply left Plaintiffs' counsel without the necessary information needed to 
ferret out a potential juror's actual bias or to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, 
thus prejudicing Plaintiffs." Id. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to 
the restrictive voir dire. Id. at ffl[ 18-19. 
The longstanding entitlement to tort reform questions is so clear, in fact, that the 
Court of Appeals' entire discussion of the issue in Bee consisted of a quotation from 
Barrett, concisely articulating why questioning prospective jurors about their views on 
tort reform issues is necessary for a fair trial, and why it is inherently prejudicial not to do 
"[I]n tort cases we cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have 
developed tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure to such 
propaganda." "Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may 
foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors." This is precisely the 
type of bias that counsel must be allowed to uncover if an impartial jury is to be 
impaneled. 
* * * 
In this case, none of the questions asked by the trial court even remotely addressed 
whether the prospective jurors had heard or read anything relating to tort-reform 
issues. Nor did the trial court attempt to address in a more general fashion the 
issues of tort-reform propaganda in its voir dire questioning. The court asked only 
broad questions concerning the prospective jurors' self-assessed ability to be fair 
and impartial. As a result of this limited line of questioning, appellant was unable 
to determine which, if any, prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform 
propaganda, much less whether that exposure produced hidden or subconscious 
biases affecting their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Thus, under 
Evans, the trial court's line of questioning ignored appellant's need to garner 
information necessary both to detect actual bias and to intelligently exercise his 
peremptory challenges. 
Bee, 2009 UT App 35, [^16, 204 P.3d 204, 209 (emphasis in original; ellipses and 
citations omitted.) 
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In this case, Mr. Boyle's request was neither ambiguous nor onerous. Of the 15 
questions proposed by him, only four were other than generic background inquiries, and 
those four all addressed the same issue: tort reform. This was not some arcane legal 
concept; this was an area in which the law has been "clear," and seemingly 
uncontroversial, for more than fifteen years. Bee, supra. 
Nonetheless, just as in Alcazar, the trial court in this case rejected Mr. Boyle's 
specific tort-reform questions, and instead asked narrow, yes-or-no questions that did 
nothing more than elicit obvious answers. After declining to elicit information as to 
jurors' prejudices regarding lawsuits and tort reform, the court then allowed defense 
counsel to appeal to those very prejudices by specifically referring to an unrelated lawsuit 
that is the "poster child" of tort reform propaganda {see infra). 
Compounding the prejudice, the trial court allowed voir dire questions that were 
beneficial to the defendant in exercising his peremptory strikes. At trial, the only issue 
was the amount of damages to be awarded from an automobile / pedestrian accident in 
which back injuries were alleged. The trial court asked specific questions regarding both 
automobile /pedestrian accidents and back injuries. 
For those who answered the defendant's questions in the affirmative, the trial 
court followed up with "who," "what," "where," "when," and "how" inquiries. (R. 693 at 
pp 30-33, 45-47.) With that information, the defendant was able to use two of his three 
"11. Have you, any close family member or close friend ever been involved in an 
automobile /pedestrian accident?" (R. 536) "12. Have you, any close family member or 
close friend ever sustained back injuries?" Id 
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peremptory strikes on a juror who had a close friend who was involved in an auto 
accident who suffered back and neck injuries {id. at 30, 31), and another juror who 
suffers from neck and back injuries from an automobile accident {id. at 45, 46). (The 
Jury List including the peremptory information is at R. 537.) 
B. The Court of Appeals' ruling that Mr. Boyle failed to preserve 
his request for tort reform voir dire by not objecting after the 
trial court's ruling conflicts with U.R.Civ.P. 46 and with other 
rulings of the Court of Appeals, and places trial counsel in an 
untenable position. 
That the trial court committed error in declining plaintiffs' request for tort reform 
questions seems unequivocal. The Court of Appeals did not order a reversal, however, 
because it concluded that Mr. Boyle waived the issue. This aspect of the Court of 
Appeals' ruling involves an important dilemma in which counsel are occasionally placed 
at trial. Before trial, courts typically require parties to submit their requested voir dire 
questionnaires. Upon review of the parties' proposed questions, the court then combines 
and/or rejects various questions, essentially ruling on the parties' requests by compiling 
the court's own list of questions. 
Most district court judges provide a copy of the final list before conducting voir 
dire. That allows counsel to see which questions are being asked and which are being 
rejected or revised, and to argue for inclusion of questions before the court conducts its 
voir dire. 
Unfortunately, that is not a universal practice. As noted above, counsel in this 
case submitted their proposed questionnaires as usual, but the trial judge gave no 
indications of his intentions regarding voir dire until he walked into court and began 
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questioning the jury pool. After concluding its list of questions, the court did not ask 
counsel if they wanted any other questions asked of the pool, or if counsel had any 
exceptions. See, by comparison, U.R.Civ.P. 51 (providing procedure for exceptions to 
jury instructions). Instead, the court proceeded immediately to challenges for cause. See 
R. 693 pp. 90-97. 
The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Boyle waived his right to appeal this alleged 
error because "[a]t no time . . . did Mr. Boyle ever indicate to the district court that the 
court's questions failed to adequately address the concerns posed by his own questions, 
and Mr. Boyle ultimately passed the jury for cause." Opinion, [^ 11. 
Because it is undisputed that the parties had no notice of the court's disposition 
before the voir dire, when the Court of Appeals says "at no time" did Mr. Boyle object to 
the court's questions, it necessarily means that Mr. Boyle did not object afterward. But 
that ruling is directly contrary to this Court's Rule of Civil Procedure 46, which the Court 
of Appeals did not address. U.R.Civ.P. 46 states: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes 
known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to 
the action of the court and his grounds therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity 
to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection 
does not thereafter prejudice him. 
(Emphasis added.) 
There is no dispute that, "at the time the ruling [was] sought," Mr. Boyle "ma[de] 
known to the court the action which he desire[d] the court to take," i.e., to ask prospective 
jurors about their views on tort reform. There is also no dispute that the court had 
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effectively ruled on the proposed voir dire when he proceeded to ask his own questions, 
and did not afford an opportunity for response, questions, exceptions, or feedback from 
counsel before moving on to challenges for cause. 
Once a court has made a decision, an attorney has no obligation to - and may risk 
serious consequences if he does - repeat a request that has already been denied, explicitly 
or otherwise, by the court. The Court of Appeals erred by failing to recognize that Rule 
46 eliminates any such requirement. 
Neither the Court of Appeals nor Mr. Christensen cited any cases holding that a 
written request for voir dire was inadequate to preserve the issue under Rule 46 and the 
procedure followed by the trial court. In fact, the Court of Appeals5 recent decision in 
Bee appears to be inconsistent. In that case, the plaintiffs counsel similarly requested 
voir dire regarding tort reform before trial, but the court did not ask the questions. "Bee 
asserts that he again raised the issue of the tort reform questions during a sidebar held off 
the record at the close of voir dire but that the trial court rejected his request to question 
the potential jurors on the issue," the Court noted. 2009 UT App. 35, f^ 4. 
As defendant Christensen pointed out to the lower court, under Lamb v. B & B 
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993), an informal sidebar is insufficient to 
preserve an issue for appeal, because it is not on the record. Therefore, the only arguable 
preservation in Bee was the written request before trial, as was done in this case. The 
Court of Appeals panel in that case apparently found that to be sufficient, reversing the 
trial court. 
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Additionally, by penalizing Mr. Boyle for passing the jury "for cause," the Court 
of Appeals is conflating the peremptory and for-cause phases of jury selection. As noted 
above, tort reform questions are pertinent to the exercise of peremptory challenges, not 
for-cause challenges. When a party has been denied such questions, and no juror has 
voluntarily provided an answer that would allow a for-cause challenge, passing the jury 
for cause to the extent they have been questioned is a party's only option. 
Under U.R.Civ.P. 46, Mr. Boyle preserved his request for voir dire on the subject 
of tort reform. However, even if some ambiguity existed on the issue, the trial court's 
failure to conduct the requested voir dire would constitute plain error anyway. For plain 
error to exist, two elements must be met: The error must be "plain," and it must be 
prejudicial. Davis, 905 P.2d 888, 892 (UT App. 1995)(abrogated on unrelated 
issue)(citing State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989)). The Court of Appeals has 
repeatedly stated that its precedent on this issue is "clear," and that the failure to ask tort 
reform questions is inherently prejudicial. Bee, supra; Alcazar, supra] Barrett, supra', 
Evans, supra. 
The Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue of plain error because, the 
court said, the issue was raised for the first time in appellants' reply brief, and therefore it 
would not be considered. Application of this general rule in the present case is not 
appropriate, however, because Mr. Boyle was not on notice that an argument would be 
made that he did not preserve the issue. (U.R.A.P. 24(a)(5)(B) requires a statement of 
grounds in the opening brief for review' of an issue "not preserved in the trial court.") 
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There is no Utah precedent that would have placed counsel on notice that 
complying with the trial court's prescribed procedure for voir dire would be claimed to be 
inadequate under Rule 46 and the circumstances of this case. As demonstrated by the 
argument above, appellants had, at the very least, a legitimate belief that preservation was 
not at issue. When the defendant challenged what appellants thought was a non-issue, 
appellants were put on notice of the issue, and responded at that time by noting, in 
addition to their other arguments, that the omission would constitute plain error. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION ALLOWING UTAH 
LAWYERS TO REFER TO THE NOTORIOUS "MCDONALD'S 
COFFEE CASE" IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT, 
GROSSLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. BOYLE AND OTHER 
PLAINTIFFS, AND CREATES A SITUATION IN WHICH CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS WILL DIGRESS INTO A DEBATE ABOUT THE 
TRUE FACTS IN THAT CASE. 
As noted above, in closing argument defense counsel was allowed, over objection, 
to compare Mr. Boyle's claim for damages to those awarded in an unrelated 1994 case 
often referred to as the "McDonald's coffee case": 
It's a per diem analysis. How many days has it been since the accident? How 
many days for the rest of his life? And how much per day is that worth? That's 
what been done here. That's how we get verdicts like in the McDonald's case 
with a cup of coffee. (R. 695, p. 48:17-22) 
No evidence was presented in the court below (nor would it have been proper) 
regarding Liebeck v. McDonald's, et al.9 D-202-CV-9302419 (N.M. - Albuquerque 
District 1994), also known as the "McDonald's coffee case." In the fifteen years since 
the (in)famous punitive damages verdict was rendered in Liebeck, it has become a 
"powerful cultural icon" and acquired "great symbolic significance" in the tort reform 
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debate, "Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon," 56 U. Miami L Rev. 113, 114 (2001), 
largely through misreporting and misstatements of the actual facts of the case. Id, pp. 
118-162. 
On appeal, defendant Christensen asked the Court of Appeals to find "harmless" 
and "innocuous" his counsel's reference to the McDonald's case "in an effort to cast light 
on Plaintiff counsel's attempt to inflate the damages by presenting them as part of a per 
diem analysis." (Brief of Appellee, p. 2; also id, pp. 1, 14, \6.)J 
Neither the defendant nor the Court of Appeals disputed that Liebeck v. 
McDonald's has become the poster child of tort reform in this country (an "iconic" case, 
as the Court of Appeals says; a case of "national notoriety," as Mr. Christensen 
concedes). By its very nature, reference to the McDonald's case is inherently prejudicial, 
particularly in a case like this, where the sole issue to be decided was damages, and the 
trial court had not asked jurors their views on general damages or tort reform. Indeed, 
counsel's reference to the case was plainly intended to appeal solely to jurors' prejudices 
about tort reform exemplified (in their minds) by that case. 
There is also no dispute that defense counsel incorrectly stated the nature of that 
case by telling the jury that the Liebeck verdict resulted from a per diem compensatory 
damages argument, when it was actually an award of punitive damages that had nothing 
to do with a per diem argument (and, in fact, was later remitted). 
3
 The defendant never identified what aspect of counsel's argument he believed to 
constitute a "per diem" argument. In any event, however, because per diem arguments 
are permissible and the defendant never objected to whatever Mr. Boyle's counsel was 
saying, Mr. Boyle has assumed that it was a per diem argument for purposes of appeal. 
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As Judge McHugh wrote in her concurrence, the latitude afforded to counsel in 
closing arguments "does not extend to counsel calling the jury's attention to material that 
the jury would not be justified in considering in its verdict." Opinion, H 29, quoting State 
v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 981 (Utah 1998). 
Here, there is nothing relevant about the Liebeck case. Christensen's closing 
argument suggests that the allegedly excessive verdict in Liebeck was caused by 
that jury's use of a per diem analysis like the one Mr. Boyle had proposed in this 
case. As Mr. Boyle correctly notes, however, the damages perceived by members 
of the public to be excessive in Liebeck were punitive damages and did not 
involve a per diem analysis. See Liebeck v. McDonald's, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 
WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994). Thus, unlike the Rodney King 
references in Alonzo, the reference to Liebeck had no arguable relevance to this 
case. 
Opinion, |^ 30 (McHugh, J., concurring in result). 
In State of Utah v. Alonzo, supra, two defendants were accused, and later found 
guilty, of assaulting a police office and one of interfering with an arrest. In his closing 
argument, their counsel attempted to draw parallels between their case and the 
controversial Rodney King case in Los Angeles. The trial court precluded references to 
the King case, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that ruling. "We 
have held in the past that attorneys have broad latitude in presenting closing arguments," 
the Court wrote, "but that such latitude does not extend to counsel calling the jury's 
attention to material that the jury would not be justified in considering in its verdict." 
973 P.2d at 981 (emphasis added). 
The majority and Judge McHugh differ in their interpretation of this court's 
opinion in Alonzo, supra. The majority reads Alonzo as allowing defense counsel to 
mention Liebeck in a personal injury trial. Judge McHugh believes that it does not, and 
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that reference to Liebeck falls within Alonzo's prohibition against calling improper 
material to the attention of the jury. Judge McHugh's interpretation of Alonzo is not only 
supported by the language of that opinion - that counsel's "latitude does not extend to" 
referencing material that could not properly have been introduced at trial - but also by 
important practical considerations. 
References to the McDonald's coffee case by defense counsel is an increasingly 
common occurrence in Utah. (It has happened at least three times recently to attorneys at 
the undersigned's firm alone.) If defense counsel can mention the McDonald's verdict, 
then plaintiffs' counsel presumably can respond by telling the jury not to worry, because 
the judge can reduce a verdict if he thinks it is too big, as ihe judge did in the 
McDonald's case. Counsel may also point out that opposing counsel is misrepresenting 
the verdict in that case. In short, closing arguments may deteriorate into a debate about a 
15-year-old New Mexico case that has nothing to do with what the jury is charged with 
deciding. 
The error was especially prejudicial in this case. Because the defendant admitted 
liability, the trial was entirely focused on the damages to be awarded. The "McDonald's 
coffee case" comment was not directed to a peripheral issue at trial, it was directed to the 
only issue at trial, the proper amount of damages to award to a plaintiff who needed back 
surgery after being struck by a vehicle. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to 
imagine how it could not be prejudicial to mention a case widely perceived by the lay 
public as a lawsuit in which excessive damages were awarded. (See, e.g., the Liebeck v. 
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McDonald's Restaurants Wikipedia entry (noting characterization of Liebeck case as wCthe 
poster child of excessive lawsuits").)4 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING ON MRS. BOYLE'S LOSS 
OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM ARTIFICIALLY NARROWS THE 
SCOPE OF THE STATUTE, AND ELIMINATES LOSS OF 
CONSORTIUM CLAIMS IN A WIDE RANGE OF CASES. 
This case presents an issue of first impression, i.e., what does the word 
"incapability" mean for purposes of the loss-of-consortium statute? 
For purposes of its motion in limine and in the Court of Appeals, defendant 
Christensen did not contest that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find a "dispute as to 
the causation and extent of Mr. Boyle's back injury," or that, from plaintiffs evidence, the 
evidence might seem "severe." (Brief of Appellee, pp. 17, 19.) It was also largely 
uncontested that the injury is permanent and life-altering. {E.g., R. 334, 342-345 (citing to 
testimony of plaintiff s expert Dr. Lyle Mason).) 
That a fact issue exists as to the existence of a significant permanent injury was thus 
essentially uncontested. Instead, Mr. Christensen's principal argument was that the Boyles 
lacked evidence of an "injur[y]" under the provision upon which Mr. Boyle was relying, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii) ("incapability of the person of performing the types of 
jobs the person performed before the injury[.]"). 
On appeal, the parties agreed that there is no Utah case law interpreting this 
language. The defendant argued that the plaintiff must be 100 percent incapable; thus, if the 
4
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liebeck_v .McDonald'sRestaurants (last accessed 
February 8,2010). 
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plaintiff retains any ability to perform the types of jobs, regardless of restrictions or 
limitations, then he is not injured under Section (l)(a)(iii). (Brief of Appellee, p. 18 (must 
be ''completely" incapable).) 
Appellant Boyle argued that the statute is satisfied if the person is materially 
incapable of performing the jobs. Materiality is typically a question of fact, see, e.g., 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluff dale City, 2007 UT 57, If 50. 167 P.3d 1016, and a 
jury could find Mr. Boyle's ability materially limited from an inability to work full-time, to 
carry anything even as heavy as a full basket of golf balls, and/or an ability to work only 
through significant pain, all of which were supported by evidence in the record. See, e.g., R. 
261-262.5 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant's interpretation, holding that the fact 
that Mr. Boyle "worked in sales and at golf course both before and after his injury" -
regardless of the nature of the jobs or any physical limitations - precludes an argument of 
"incapacity." Opinion, ^ 22.6 
Under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute, an injury could relegate an 
individual to permanent part-time employment with significant ramifications (loss of 
benefits, impaired promotional opportunities, etc.), or with physical restrictions, yet 
5
 In relation to this issue, Mr. Boyle also cited evidence from which a jury could have 
found that the jobs he was working after the accident were materially different from the 
same type as the jobs he performed before the injury. See, e.g., R. 331-332 (former job 
included training functions, extensive driving to private residences for sales presentations, 
and very high income potential, whereas present job is sedentary work at a call center). 
6
 The Court of Appeals' opinion uses the word "incapacity," whereas the statute uses the 
word "incapability." 
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technically he would not be ''completely" incapable of performing the work, and therefore 
no loss of consortium could be sought. Indeed, the plaintiff might be able to work only 
standing up, or for only a few hours per week, and he would still not qualify under 
(l)(a)(iii). That is not a reasonable interpretation. State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 
(Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible 
construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable 
result.'^(internal citation omitted). 
As one Utah federal district court judge recently observed, "Such a literal reading 
of the statute is not warranted by the face of the statute." Spahr v. Ferber Resorts, LLC,, 
2:08-cv-72, United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, Order 
and Memorandum Decision at 8-9 (J. Waddoups, February 4, 2010) (attached hereto as 
Add.Exh. 5.) In Spahr; the plaintiff suffered a knee injury from a fall on the defendant's 
premises, and a jury found for both Mr. Spahr and for his wife on her loss-of-consortium 
claim. Seeking a new trial, the defendant argued that Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-
1 l(l)(a)(iii) was not satisfied because, although Mr. Spahr "could not kneel to garden and 
could not climb ladders to engage in carpentry," that was insufficient under the statute. 
"Ferber Resorts contends that 'incapability' in § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii) must be read literally, 
meaning that if Mr. Spahr has any possible means to perform jobs, he is capable of those 
jobs," the court summarized. See id. at 8. 
The court rejected such a narrow interpretation of the statute: 
Unless they are paralyzed (which is covered separately by § 30-2-11(1 )(a)(I)), 
resourceful people may often find new and inventive ways to accomplish many of 
the same jobs they did before injury. For example, Mr. Spahr may be able to 
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garden lying down, or to buy a hydraulic lift to help him build ceilings or complete 
other jobs that would normally be done on a ladder. Rather than being literally 
and completely incapable of doing a job even in a most limited and extraordinary 
way, then, being unable to engage in an essential part of a job in a routine manner 
must suffice to make one incapable of performing that job under the statute. In 
this case, the evidence reasonably supported a finding by the jury that Mr. Spahr 
was incapable of performing many of the jobs he had done before the injury. It 
cannot be reasonably disputed that as a routine matter, gardening requires kneeling 
and carpentry requires climbing ladders. 
Id. at 9.7 
It is apparent from the language of the statute that the legislature was only 
interested in allowing a consortium claim where serious, ongoing injuries were involved 
in order to avoid soft, frivolous claims. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. 
Boyle, the evidence adduced in opposition to defendant's motion in limine reflected that 
Mr. Boyle, after his back surgery, is suffering from ongoing pain issues that are extensive 
enough that he is incapable of sleeping anywhere other than in a recliner, is suffering 
from recurring sleep deprivation causing an inability to work full-time at a sedentary job, 
and is unable to even lift a small amount of weight at his slightly less than sedentary job 
at the golf course. Even with very little physical exertion delivering golf carts and 
staffing a golf shop, he is still in enough pain after just a few hours that he has to go 
home and rest for a couple of hours to alleviate the pain. (E.g., R. 261:12-21; R. 262:10-
22.) 
The defendant in Spahr cited the Court of Appeals' ruling in this case for its restrictive 
interpretation of the statute. The federal court distinguished Boyle factually based upon 
the Court of Appeals' statement that Mr. Boyle "admitted in his deposition that he had 
performed the same jobs after his injury that he had performed before his injury, albeit in 
'significant discomfort.'" Id. at 9. But as noted above, Mr. Boyle cannot work full time 
or lift anything heavy, and there was evidence from which the jury could find that his 
pre-accident and post-accident jobs were not "the same jobs." See p. 26, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants / Plaintiffs respectfully request the 
Court reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the 
claims of John and Norrine Boyle. 
DATED this \%J day of February, 2010. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Roger P. ChristeiTsen 
Karra J. Porter 
Scot A. Boyd 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
fl John and Norrine Boyle, husband and wife, appeal from the 
district court's judgment awarding Mr. Boyle damages of $62,500 
against Kerry Christensen. We affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In 2004, Christensen struck Mr. Boyle with his vehicle while 
Mr. Boyle was walking in a crosswalk located in a grocery store 
parking lot. As a result, Mr. Boyle suffered back injuries that 
ultimately required back surgery. The surgery was only partially 
successful and left Mr. Boyle with chronic back pain. In 2005, 
the Boyles sued Christensen for negligence and loss of 
consortium. 
f3 In January 2008, Christensen filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. 
Boyle's loss of consortium claim. Christensen's motion argued 
that loss of consortium as a cause of action is governed by 
statute and requires an "injury" as that term is statutorily 
defined. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (Supp. 2008). The 
district court agreed with Christensen that Mr. Boyle's claimed 
injuries did not meet the statutory definition of an injury and 
dismissed Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
1(4 Trial on Mr. Boyle's negligence claim took place in June 
2008. As trial approached, Mr. Boyle submitted a proposed jury 
questionnaire that included specific questions intended to elicit 
jurors' views regarding damages and tort reform. Christensen 
also submitted proposed voir dire questions, and the district 
court edited and combined the parties' proposed questions into a 
single set of voir dire questions that did not contain the exact 
questions posed by either party. The district court conducted 
voir dire using its own questions without objection from either 
party. At the close of voir dire, both Mr. Boyle and Christensen 
passed the jury for cause. 
%5 Christensen had admitted liability for Mr. Boyle's injuries, 
and trial commenced solely on the issue of damages. After each 
side rested its case, the parties made their closing arguments to 
the jury. During Christensen's closing argument, his counsel 
characterized Mr. Boyle's closing argument relating to pain and 
suffering damages as follows: 
It's a per diem analysis. How many days has 
it been since the accident? How many days 
for the rest of his life? And how much per 
day is that worth? That's what's been done 
here. That's how we get verdicts like in the 
McDonald's case with a cup of coffee. 
Mr. Boyle's counsel timely objected to the reference to "the 
McDonald's case"--a New Mexico lawsuit docketed as Liebeck v. 
McDonald's Restaurants, case no. D-202-CV-9302419, that resulted 
in a famously large 1994 jury verdict--stating that "it's 
prejudicial and it's not in evidence." The district court 
overruled this objection, and Christensen's counsel completed her 
closing argument without further reference to Lieb€*ck. 
f6 The jury ultimately rendered Mr. Boyle a damages verdict of 
$62,500, of which $27,800 was for general pain and suffering. 
The jury's general damages award was significantly less than that 
sought by Mr. Boyle, and he appeals from the resulting judgment. 
Mrs. Boyle also appeals from the dismissal of her loss of 
consortium claim. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
%7 Mr. Boyle first argues that the district court erred in 
failing to question potential jurors on the issues of juror bias 
and tort reform. "We review challenges to the trial court's 
management of jury voir dire under an abuse of discretion 
standard." Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, 1 8, 204 
P.3d 204 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, alleged 
deficiencies in voir dire must be brought to the district court's 
attention in order to be preserved for appeal. See Doe v. Hafen# 
772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
H8 Next, Mr. Boyle argues that the district court erred by 
allowing Christensen to reference Liebeck in his closing 
argument. "The determination of whether remarks made during 
closing argument improperly influenced the verdict is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 
62, 1 35, 29 P.3d 638. 
%9 Finally, Mrs. Boyle argues that the district court erred 
when it granted Christensen's motion to dismiss her loss of 
consortium claim. "We review a trial court's ruling on a motion 
to dismiss for correctness, according no deference to the trial 
court." Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT App 390, H 3, 174 
P.3d 1134; see also Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, H 9, 99 P.3d 
842. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Tort Reform 
flO Mr. Boyle's first argument on appeal is that the district 
court erred in failing to conduct voir dire questioning on issues 
relating to juror bias and tort reform. In his jury 
questionnaire, Mr. Boyle proposed the following voir dire 
questionsi1 
4[.] What are your feelings or opinions 
about people who bring personal injury 
lawsuits? If supported by the evidence, 
could you award a large amount of money to 
the plaintiff in this case? 
xMr. Boyle's questionnaire included various "yes" or "no" 
check boxes that have been omitted here for ease of quotation. 
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5[.] If you were seriously hurt or injured 
by the negligence of another, would you sue? 
Please explain your answer: 
6[.] If supported by the evidence, could you 
award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain 
b. Mental anguish 
c. The impact on a wife of partially 
disabling injuries to her husband? 
d. Future medical bills 
If you answered NO to any of the above, 
please explain: 
7[.] Do you believe the law should impose 
limits on money that can be awarded for pain 
and suffering[?] If YES, what do you believe 
these limitations should be? 
The district court did not ask the potential jurors these 
questions but, rather, conducted voir dire using a set of 
questions that it had drafted itself. 
Ull The district court's voir dire asked potential jurors the 
following questions relating to juror attitudes about personal 
injury claims and damages: 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that 
would prevent you from being fair and 
impartial regarding persons who have personal 
injury disputes and who choose to resolve 
those disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal, religious or 
other beliefs that would prevent you from 
awarding damages in a large amount, small 
amount, or zero amount, if warranted and 
justified by the evidence and the law given 
you by the Court? 
15. Given all considerations and everything 
you know about this case so far, can you be a 
fair, impartial, neutral, judge of the facts 
and follow the law as given to you by the 
Court? 
At no time, however, did Mr. Boyle ever indicate to the district 
court that the court's questions failed to adequately address the 
concerns posed by his own questions, and Mr. Boyle ultimately 
passed the jury for cause. 
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i[l2 Mr. Boyle argues on appeal that his mere submission of 
specific jury questions relating to damages and tort reform 
preserves for appeal his claim that the voir dire questions the 
district court actually posed were inadequate. We disagree. 
If[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main St. v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 51, 99 P.3d 801 (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district 
court attempted to reconcile the parties' proposed jury questions 
into a single set of voir dire questions that addressed each 
party's concerns. If Mr. Boyle believed that the district 
court's modification of his questions constituted error on the 
part of the district court, it was his obligation to bring this 
alleged error to the district court's attention. His failure to 
do so constitutes a waiver of the issue as one for appeal. See 
id.; compare Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding no preservation where a party failed to "call the 
judge's attention to [a] specific question" in a set of voir dire 
questions that had been rejected by the trial court), with 
Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, 
1 5, 188 P.3d 490 (addressing substantive issue where appellant 
had "repeatedly attempted to persuade the trial court to give the 
requested voir dire questions, including briefing the rather 
direct authority from this court on the issue, [but] the court 
declined and offered its own unique philosophical approach to 
voir dire in medical malpractice cases"). 
Ul3 Mr. Boyle argues for the first time in his reply brief that 
the district court's failure to question the jury on the 
requested issues constitutes plain error and is thus an exception 
to the preservation requirements. See generally Nielsen v. 
Spencer, 2008 UT App 375, H 14, 196 P.3d 616 (discussing plain 
error), cert, denied, 207 P.3d 432 (Utah 2009). In the past, we 
have refused to consider arguments of plain error raised for the 
first time in an appellant's reply brief, even if the plain error 
argument is in response to a dispute over preservation raised for 
the first time in the appellee's brief. See, e.g., Moore v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 101, 1 24, 158 P.3d 562, cert, denied, 182 
P.3d 910 (Utah 2007). Accordingly, we do not conduct a plain 
error analysis here. 
Kl4 We conclude that Mr. Boyle failed to adequately preserve for 
appeal his claim that the district court's voir dire questioning 
was inadequate. Although the district court did not ask the 
exact questions submitted by Mr. Boyle, it did ask related 
questions. Thereafter, Mr. Boyle passed the jury for cause 
without objection and without explaining the alleged harm 
resulting from the fact that his proposed questions had not been 
asked. Under these circumstances, Mr. Boyle failed to preserve 
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any claim of error arising from the district court's failure to 
ask his submitted questions. Accordingly, we decline to address 
that issue. 
II. Closing Arguments 
fl5 Mr. Boyle next argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because of Christensen's counsel's reference to Liebeck--the 
McDonald's coffee case--in her closing argument. Closing 
arguments represent the final opportunity for parties to 
summarize their cases and attempt to influence the jury, and 
parties are allowed substantial leeway in doing so. See State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 973 P.2d 
975 (Utah 1998) . 
Counsel for both sides have considerable 
latitude in their closing arguments. They 
have the right to fully discuss from their 
perspectives the evidence and all inferences 
and deductions it: supports. However, counsel 
exceeds the bounds of this discretion and 
commits error if he or she calls to the 
jury's attention material that the jury would 
not be justified in considering in reaching 
its verdict. 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Boyle 
attempts to characterize Christensen's counsel's comment as one 
that "calls to the jury's attention material that the jury would 
not be justified in considering in reaching its verdict," see 
id., but we reject that characterization. 
|^16 Mr. Boyle argues that there had been no evidence presented 
about the Liebeck case and that the reference was therefore 
improper as "unrelated commentary . . . that is not supported by 
the evidence." Mr. Boyle cites State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998), in support 
of his argument. In Alonzo, the defendants were charged with 
assaulting a police officer following a physical altercation 
between the defendants and police. See id. at 608-09. During 
closing arguments, the defendants referred to "'those Rodney King 
cops that are doing time in the Federal pen'" in an attempt to 
illustrate that police officers who use excessive force could 
lose their jobs and go to jail. See id. at 614-15. The district 
court disallowed this use of the Rodney King matter but did 
clarify "that the jury could consider defense counsel's arguments 
involving the Rodney King officers for the purpose of weighing 
'the credibility of the witnesses, if they want to examine it in 
that way.'" Id. at 615. This court affirmed the district 
court's treatment of the Rodney King issues. See id. 
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1|l7 Mr. Boyle has failed to demonstrate that Alonzo renders 
Christensen1s counsel's reference to Liebeck erroneous. In both 
this case and Alonzo, counsel used references to iconic legal 
matters to make legitimate points to the jury. Mr. Boyle argues 
that Liebeck is synonymous with excessive verdicts and runaway 
juries, and that may be true. But we see no harm in allowing 
Christensen to use a cultural reference as shorthand to make the 
point that, in Christensen's opinion, Mr. Boyle's damages 
methodology was likely to render this jury's verdict excessive. 
Such an argument is not inappropriate, and Christensen's 
counsel's use of Liebeck to illustrate the point is surely no 
more objectionable than counsel's usage of what is arguably the 
nation's most famous police brutality case in Alonzo,2 see id. at 
614-15. 
fl8 In sum, we see no error created by Christensen's counsel's 
comment to the jury. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the 
judgment below on this ground. 
III. Mrs. Boyle's Loss of Consortium Claim 
Ul9 Finally, Mrs. Boyle argues that the district court erred 
when it dismissed her loss of consortium claim. We agree with 
the district court that Mrs. Boyle failed to present evidence 
that would support a loss of consortium claim under the parties' 
mutual interpretation of the governing statute. 
1|2 0 Loss of consortium claims are governed by Utah Code section 
30-2-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (Supp. 2008). "The spouse 
of a person injured by a third party . . . may maintain an action 
against the third party to recover for loss of consortium." Id. 
§ 30-2-11(2). However, not every injury to a spouse will support 
a loss of consortium claim. Section 30-2-11 defines the required 
degree of injury: 
"[I]njury" or "injured" means a significant 
permanent injury to a person that 
2We note that Mr. Boyle's counsel also made reference to 
Liebeck in his closing argument, albeit in reply to Christensen's 
counsel's comment: 
The McDonald's case was mentioned. What was 
not mentioned is the court has a right to, 
and did, fix that. The bad verdict got all 
the press. The fact that the court reduced 
it to less than I think ten percent of the 
original amount of course didn't make the 
press. 
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substantially changes that person's lifestyle 
and includes the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of 
one or more of the extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of 
performing the types of jobs the person 
performed before the injury. 
Id. § 30-2-11(1) (a) . 
1|21 Here, both parties argued to the district court and on 
appeal that no loss of consortium claim will lie unless the 
injured spouse suffers paralysis of an extremity, significant 
disfigurement, or job incapacity. Accepting this interpretation 
of the statute for purposes of this appeal,3 we agree with the 
district court that Mr. Boyle's injuries do not fall within the 
statutory definition of an injury. 
f22 On appeal, Mrs. Boyle argues that Mr. Boyle's injuries meet 
the job incapacity prong of the statutory definition because he 
"is impaired in his ability to perform the job to the same degree 
and extent that he could prior to the incident."4 However, that 
prong of the statute does not speak in terms of impairment but, 
rather, "incapacity." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(1)(a)(iii). 
Mr. Boyle's deposition established that he worked in sales and at 
a golf course both before and after his injury. Although these 
jobs apparently caused Mr. Boyle significant discomfort after the 
injury, he was capable of performing them. In light of these 
facts, Mrs. Boyle has not presented evidence that Mr. Boyle is 
"incapab [le] . . . of performing the types of jobs [he] performed 
before the injury." See id. 
f23 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district 
court erred in dismissing Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
Mrs. Boyle agreed with Christensen that the relevant statute 
required one of three specific types of injuries in order for her 
3We express no opinion on whether the parties are correct in 
their interpretation of section 30-2-11(1) (a) . 
4Mrs. Boyle does not argue on appeal that her claim can 
proceed under either of the other statutory prongs--paralysis of 
an extremity or significant disfigurement. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-2-11(1) (a) (i)- (ii) (Supp. 2008). 
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claim to be actionable, and she failed to present evidence that 
Mr. Boyle's injuries fell into one of the required categories. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Mrs. Boyle's 
loss of consortium claim. 
CONCLUSION 
1(24 We conclude that Mr. Boyle did not adequately preserve his 
argument that the district court erred in failing to ask 
requested juror bias and tort reform questions on voir dire. We 
also conclude that no error arose from Christensen's counsel's 
closing argument reference to Liebeck and that the district court 
properly dismissed Mrs. Boyle's loss of consortium claim. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
H25 I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
MCHUGH, Judge (concurring in result): 
f26 While I agree with my colleagues that the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed, I write separately to indicate my 
differing view on the challenge to Christensen's closing 
argument. Although I agree that the narrow use of the Liebeck v. 
McDonald's, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. 
Aug. 18, 1994), decision was not prejudicial, I would hold that 
it was improper. Furthermore, I do not read State v. Alonzof 932 
P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998), 
as approving the introduction of such extraneous matter during 
closing argument. 
^27 The Alonzo defendants claimed that police officers had used 
excessive force against them and, in closing argument, cited the 
prison sentences imposed on the police officers involved in the 
Rodney King case as an example of why police officers would be 
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motivated to lie about their use of force against a defendant. 
See id. at 614-15. The trial court overruled the State's 
objections to the references, but gave the jury a limiting 
instruction that allowed it to consider the references only to 
the extent they related to the credibility of the police 
officers. See id. at 615. Credibility was at issue because the 
stories of the defendants and those of the police officers about 
the circumstances of the arrest varied greatly and because the 
prosecution had suggested that the defendants had a motive to 
lie. See id. at 609, 614-15. After deliberations, the jury 
found the defendants guilty of assault on a police officer. See 
id. at 610. 
f28 On appeal to this court, the defendants argued that the 
limitations on the use of the Rodney King references constituted 
prejudicial error. See id. at 615. This court affirmed, holding 
that "the trial court's restrictions on defense counsel's 
references to the 'Rodney King' officers were not improper." Id. 
On certiorari, the supreme court agreed that "the trial court 
properly restricted certain references to Rodney King as material 
the jury should not consider." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 
981 (Utah 1998). However, neither this court nor the supreme 
court was asked to consider the issue present here--whether the 
references to the unrelated case were proper at all. 
f29 After acknowledging the broad latitude generally available 
in presenting closing arguments, the supreme court in Alonzo 
stated, "[S]uch latitude does not extend to counsel calling the 
jury's attention to material that the jury would not be justified 
in considering in its verdict." Id. at 981. Indeed, the opinion 
issued by this court, which was affirmed by the supreme court, is 
more explicit: 
Although counsel has considerable latitude in 
closing arguments, the trial court could have 
reasonably concluded that defense counsel was 
exceeding the bounds of this discretion when 
counsel referred to the Rodney King officers. 
The trial court could have determined that 
defense counsel's references to Rodney King 
were an attempt to inflame the jury or 
suggest that because the Rodney King officers 
were found guilty, the officers in this case 
were also guilty of using excessive force. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 615 (emphasis added). If the trial court 
could have excluded the references entirely as inflammatory, it 
is not surprising that the limitations placed on the use of the 
Rodney King argument did not constitute prejudicial error. 
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i[3 0 Moreover, in Alonzo, the Rodney King references could be 
considered by the jury only in weighing the credibility of the 
police officers and their motive to lie. See id. at 615-16. 
These matters were legitimately at issue due to the differences 
between the testimony of the officers and that of the defendants, 
and by the State's suggestion that only the defendants had a 
motive to lie. Here, there is nothing relevant about the Liebeck 
case. Christensen's closing argument suggests that the allegedly 
excessive verdict in Liebeck was caused by that jury's use of a 
per diem analysis like the one Mr. Boyle had proposed in this 
case. As Mr. Boyle correctly notes, however, the damages 
perceived by members of the public to be excessive in Liebeck 
were punitive damages and did not involve a per diem analysis. 
See Liebeck v. McDonald's, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 
(N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994). Thus, unlike the Rodney King 
references in Alonzo, the reference to Liebeck had no arguable 
relevance to this case. 
f31 Under these circumstances, I would hold that the references 
to the McDonald's coffee case improperly "call[ed] the jury's 
attention to material that the jury would not [have been] 
justified in considering in its verdict." Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 
981. Moreover, the fact that the Liebeck case is "iconic," 
"synonymous with excessive verdicts," or even infamous would make 
me more inclined to find its use in oral argument improper rather 
than less so inclined. Supra % 17. 
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This matter is before the Court for a Ruling from the Oral 
Argument heard on 5/19/08. Appearances as stated above. 
1. Defendants Motion in Limine to Dismiss Plaintiff Norrine 
Boyle's Loss of Consortium Claim is Granted. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Strike Lyle B Mason's Expert Testimony 
is Denied. 
3 Defendant's Motion to Strike Helen Woodward as an Expert 
Witness is granted. 
Kristin Van Orman is to prepare an Order with in 1 week. The 
Court would like this Order to be approved as to form. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 








Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came before the Court on May 19, 2008 for Defendant's motions in 
limine seeking to exclude Helen Woodard and Dr. Lyle Mason as expert witnesses as well 
as Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff Norrine Boyle's claims for loss of consortium 
Oral argument was held with Roger Christensen in attendance for the plaintiffs and Kristin 
VanOrman representing the defendant. 
After review of the submitted briefs as well as considering oral argument, this Court 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
> 
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1. Defendant's motion to exclude Helen Woodard is granted. Ms. Woodard's report 
was produced late in the proceedings in violation of this Court's case management 
order. 
2. Defendant's motion to exclude Dr. Lyle Mason is denied. Defense counsel is to be 
given the opportunity to depose Dr. Mason prior to the trial of this matter. 
3. Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of consortium 
is granted. It is the Court's ruling that the plaintiffs do not meet the statutory 
requirements for bringing a claim for loss of consortium and therefore such a claim 
is hereby dismissed. 
DATED this I 2 _ day of May, 2008. 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Thtra District Court Judc 
^>>'> » 
w
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m. The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ^ ^ day of May, 2008, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was served by mail, postage fully prepaid, upon the 
following: 
Roger P. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR THE 
SUBMISSION OF A JURY 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND FOR 
REASONABLE FOLLOW UP VOIR DIRE 
Case No: 050912506 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Plaintiff hereby requests the Court to have the attached questionnaire completed by the 
potential jurors in this case, with copies provided to the Court and counsel, prior to the jury 
selection process. 
Plaintiff also requests the Court to allow plaintiffs' counsel the opportunity to ask 
reasonable jury voir dire questions following up on the individual jurors answers to the 
questionnaire. Plaintiff also requests the Court to allow plaintiffs' counsel to address the 
following additional areas with individual jurors injury voir dire: 
1. The juror's willingness and/or reluctance to follow the law, as instructed by the 
Court, in spite of personal disagreement with it. 
2. Experience, training, knowledge and insights regarding people who have 
sustained some level of back injury and/or chronic pain. 
DATED this / 5 d a y of April, 2008. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSENd\C. 
^er P jpmstensen 
Attory^jor Plaintiffs 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this [Q day of A p r 11 , 2008 a copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR THE SUBMISSION OF A JURY QUESTIONAIRE AND FOR 
REASONABLE FOLLOW UP VOIR DIRE was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Kristin A. Van Orman 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
The information given in this questionnaire is confidential and will be used only to assist with jury 
selection in this case. 
JUROR NAME: AGE: JUROR #: 
. / 
1K4. What is the highest grade that you 
completed in school? 
If college, please list any degrees 
received: 
4. What are your feelings or opinions 
about people who bring personal injury 
lawsuits? 
If supported by the evidence, could you 
award a large amount of money to the 
plaintiff in this case? 
7. Do you believe the law should impose 
limits on money that can be awarded for 
pain and suffering: 
D Yes D No 
If YES, what do you believe these 
limitations should be? 
, / 
1 V. Where do you work and what is your 
job title? ' 
What jobs have you held in the past? 
What jobs has your spouse or significant 
other held in the past? 
\ ' 
X If you were seriously hurt or injured 
"by the negligence of another, would you 
sue? 
Please explain your answer. 
18. Have you ever been the plaintiff (the 
party suing) or a defendant (the party 
being sued) in a lawsuit? • Yes D No 
If YES, please explain: 
v *• 
1,^. Circle any of the following in which 
you have received training or education: 
! Business Law 
Engineering Psychology 
Health/Medicine Statistics 
Insurance Teaching j 
Accident Investigation 
6. If supported by the evidence, could 
you award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain D Yes D No 
b. Mental anguish • Yes D No 
c. The impact on a wife of partially 
disabling injuries to her husband? 
d. Future medical bills • Yes • No 
If you answered NO to any of the above, 
please explain: \ 
• 9-. Have you ever served as a juror in a 
civil case? • Yes • No 
If YES, what type of civil case was it? 
What was the verdict in that case? 
Were you the foreperson? • Yes • No 
Do you have any negative feelings as a 
result of your experience as a juror? 
• Yes • No 
If YES, please explain: 
\?m 





What newspapers, magazines, or journals 
do you read regularly? 
[ 13 Which of the following words would 
you use to describe yourself? Please 
check all that apply 
D Analytical D Old-fashioned 
• Careful D Open-minded 
| • Compassionate • Pro-business 
• Detail-oriented D Pro-consumer 
• Emotional • Sensitive 
D Frugal • Skeptical 
D Generous • Suspicious 
• Impulsive D Visual 
D Judgmental • Worrier 
\iX What groups or organizations do 
you/loved ones/family members belong 
1 to? 
\4 What do you enjoy doing in your 
spare time? 
Do you consider yourself to be 
• Conservative • Moderate D Liberal 
Who makes the financial decisions in 
your home? 
Who writes the checks or pays the bills 
in your home? 









15 Is there any reason you could not 1 
serve as a juror in this case? 
D Yes • No 
If YES, please explain 
Add any comments you wish to make 
I hereby swear or affirm that all the answers contained in this juror questionnaire are true and correct 
Juror's Signature Date 
Addendum 
Exhibit 4 
J U R Y 
State your name and your spouse's name. 
How are you employed? How is your spouse 
What is the highest grade that you completed in school? 
How do you spend your leisure time? Do you have any hobbies? 
Are you a member of any clubs or organizations? Any leadership 
positions? 
Have you ever worked in or received training in the health care 
profession, legal profession, or any profession that handles medical 
and injury claims? 
Have you ever served on a jury? 
Have you, any close family member or close friend ever been a 
plaintiff, defendant or a witness in any lawsuit? 
Have you, any close family member or close friend ever made a claim 
for personal injuries against someone whether or not such claim 
resulted in a lawsuit? 
Have you, any close family member or close friend ever had a claim 
for personal injuries made against you or them? 
Have you, any close family member or close friend ever been involved 
in an automobile/pedestrian accident? 
Have you, any close family members or friends ever sustained back 
injuries? 
Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you from 
being fair and impartial regarding persons who have personal injury 
disputes and who choose to resolve those disputes by going to court? 
Do you have any personal, religious or other beliefs that would 
prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, small amount, 
or zero amount, if warranted and justified by the evidence and the 
law given you by the Court? 
Given all considerations and everything you know about this case so 
far, can you be a fair, impartial, neutral, judge of the facts and 
follow the law as given to you by the Court? 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN-3 2008 
OJ LAKE COUKTY 
Addendum 
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THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
E. JAMES SPAHR and COLLEEN SPAHR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 





Case No. 2:08-cv-72-CW 
Now before the court is Defendant Ferber Resort's motion for a judgment as a matter of law 
or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur (Dkt. No. 26).l For the reasons discussed below, 
this motion is DENIED in its entirety. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs E. James Spahr and Colleen Spahr brought this action for negligence and loss of 
consortium against Ferber Resorts. In short, Mr. Spahr suffered a serious knee injury after falling 
1
 Ferber Resorts' motion for oral argument on this matter (Dkt. No. 107) is DENIED. 
Ferber Resorts has already had two opportunities to argue its position at summary judgment and 
at trial. Moreover, oral argument will not assist the court in resolving this motion, as it is not 
particularly complicated. Under DUCiv.R. 7.1(f), therefore, Ferber Resorts has not shown good 
cause to hold a hearing and this motion will be decided on the basis of the written memoranda. 
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into a six foot deep concrete ditch while he walked from his room toward the motel office across 
a parking lot of the Rodeway Inn operated by Ferber Resorts. The Rodeway Inn was located in 
Springdale, Utah and the accident happened in the early morning hours. The Spahrs contended 
that Ferber Resorts failed to provide adequate lighting and protection for guests against falling in 
the ditch, since it was open, very near the parking lot connecting the guest buildings and the 
office building, and could be mistaken for a continuation of the parking lot in the early morning 
darkness. 
A week-long jury trial was held starting on October 19, 2009. At the close of the Spahrs' 
evidence, Ferber Resorts moved for a judgment as a matter of law on both counts. The court 
denied this motion. On October 23, 2009, the jury reached a verdict in favor of the Spahrs on 
both claims, finding on the negligence claim that Ferber Resorts was 99% at fault for the 
accident, while Mr. Spahr was 1% at fault. The court entered judgment on the jury's verdict on 
October 29, 2009 in the amount of $393,001.45 in favor of Mr, Spahr and $42,498.55 in favor of 
Ms. Spahr. 
Ferber Resorts made a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50 or alternatively for remittitur or a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. In 
support of its motion for judgment of a matter of law, Ferber Resorts contends that the verdict 
was contrary to law because Ferber Resorts owed no duty to Mr. Spahr and because Ms. Spahr 
did not satisfy the requirements under Utah law for her loss of consortium claim. In support of 
its request for new trial or remittitur, Ferber Resorts asserts that the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence, that the awards were excessive, and that the jury was improperly 
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prejudiced by the Spahrs' closing arguments. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Legal Standards 
A. Judgement as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 
"Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when the evidence presented at trial 
does not permit a reasonable jury to find for the non-movant." Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 
1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In deciding such a motion, a court must "not 
weigh evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, the court "must view the evidence and 
all inferences in the light most favorable to. . . the non-moving party, and... must be guided by 
the requirements of the underlying cause of action." Palmer v. City ofMonticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 
1503 (10th Cir. 1994). 
B. New Trial or Remittitur under Rule 59 
A motion for a new trial or remittitur under Rule 59 should be granted only if the jury's 
verdict is "clearly, decidedly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence." Escue v. 
Northern Okl. College, 450 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Moreover, when considering such a motion, "the jury's award is inviolate 
unless. . . it [is] 'so excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience and raises an irresistible 
inference that passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper cause invaded the trial.'" M.D. 
Mark Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 766 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). As with 
a motion under Rule 50, when considering a motion under Rule 59 for a new trial or remittitur, 
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all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties. See Escue, 450 
F.3datll56. 
II. Ferber Resorts' Motion 
A. Judgement as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 
Ferber Resorts argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both Mr. 
Spahr's negligence claim and Ms. Spahr's loss of consortium claim. The evidence at trial was 
sufficient to support the jury verdict finding Ferber Resorts liable on both claims, requiring the 
court to deny both motions. 
1. Ferber Resorts Owed a Legal Duty to Protect Mr,. Spahr from a 
Dangerous Condition. 
Ferber Resorts contends that Mr Spahr knew that he was walking into the darkest part of 
the property and took the risk that he might be injured as a result. According to Ferber Resorts, 
Mr. Spahr's doing so relieved Ferber Resorts of any legal duty to Mr. Spahr. 
The court concludes that the evidence does not compel a finding that, because Mr. Spahr 
knew it was dark, the dangerous condition at the Rodeway Inn should have been open and 
obvious to him. To the contrary, Mr. Spahr presented evidence that reasonably supported the 
jury's finding that Ferber Resorts had a legal duty to provide adequate lighting and otherwise 
protect against the risk that a person would not see the ditch while attempting to walk from the 
motel rooms to the motel office. For example, Mr. Spahr testified that while attempting to reach 
the office in the early morning hours he was not simply walking into a pitch dark area. Rather, 
he recalled that there was bright lighting near the guest buildings and ambient lighting as he 
walked away from the guest buildings. Moreover, there was a light on near the office which he 
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testified he was walking directly toward. There was also evidence that the drive way light on the 
pole next to the ditch was not on, the automatic timer apparently having turned the light off long 
before day light. This testimony was corroborated by other evidence. Mr. Spahr further testified 
that the area of the ditch that he walked into appeared to him to be a continuation of the 
pavement, not simply an abyss. The photographs of the ditch and its surroundings, as well as 
other evidence, support this testimony. This testimony, along with other evidence, supports a 
finding that the darkness into which Mr. Spahr walked did not alone reasonably put him on 
notice of a danger.2 
Ferber Resorts relatedly argues that the question regarding an open and obvious danger on 
the verdict form was improper. On the form, the jury was asked if the condition of the land was 
an open and obvious danger to Mr. Spahr. Ferber Resorts contends that the jury should have 
2
 Ferber Resorts also argues in reply that the darkness was the only possible source of 
negligence and that darkness was a temporary condition of which Mr. Spahr did not show Ferber 
Resorts had notice. First, because Ferber Resorts makes these arguments for the first time on 
reply and not in response to any argument in Mr. Spahr's opposition, they may be disregarded. 
In any event, these arguments have no merit. The facts support a conclusion that it was negligent 
for Ferber Resorts to leave the ditch unlit and unprotected because it was reasonably foreseeable 
that someone exercising proper care might nonetheless fall in the ditch. More specifically, the 
jury could have reasonably concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable to Ferber Resorts that a 
guest in low lighting might mistake the ditch for a continuation of the parking lot's pavement. 
Moreover, it is clear that Ferber Resorts made a decision to place the lights on an automatic timer 
that turned the lights off before day light during part of the year. The dangerous condition was 
created by the lack of lighting and the unprotected ditch opening. While providing lighting might 
have helped to avoid a negligence claim, the lack of lighting was not the only cause of the 
dangerous condition here. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that even if 
the accident had occurred before the automatic light turned off, Ferber Resorts was still aware of 
a dangerous condition under Ferber Resorts' control. In any event, in Instruction 22, the jury was 
specifically informed that a business owner cannot be held liable for a condition of which the 
owner had no knowledge. Ferber Resorts was therefore free to argue to the jury that it had 
insufficient notice to say that it knew of any danger. 
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been separately asked whether the darkness alone was open and obvious to Mr. Spahr and 
whether he knowingly took a risk by walking into that darkness. But there is no Utah case in 
which darkness by itself governed the open and obvious inquiry. Rather, in cases such as Black 
v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212, 212-14 (Utah 1975), Utah courts look at all the circumstances in which 
the plaintiff found him or herself in darkness, including, among other things, the degree of the 
darkness, the characteristics of the area in which the plaintiff encountered Ihe darkness, and the 
obvious alternatives to walking into the darkness. The Second Restatement of Torts, on which 
Ferber Resorts relies, underlies this principle, stating that if a "person knows of the actual 
conditions and dangers involved," then such a person can be said to have purposely incurred a 
risk. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(A) (emphasis added). This statement of the law 
makes plain that darkness is but one factor in the factual analysis of whether there was a known 
danger. In this case, the evidence fairly supported a jury finding that the darkness was only one 
factor that created the dangerous condition. 
In any event, Ferber Resorts was free to, and did, argue to the jury that the darkness was 
so extreme that any reasonable person would have taken the darkness alone as a danger. Ferber 
Resorts also made other arguments that the danger was open and obvious. For example, Ferber 
Resorts pointed to safer alternatives that Ferber Resorts contended should have been obvious to 
Mr. Spahr. Ferber Resorts also argued that Mr. Spahr was not walking on pavement immediately 
before he fell into the ditch, and the characteristics of the terrain on which he was walking should 
have given him notice of a potential danger. Ferber Resorts also suggested that during his 
several day stay at the motel Mr. Spahr had seen or should have seen the area into which he fell 
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before he attempted to walk to the office in the dark. None of these arguments were precluded by 
the form of the question on the verdict form. If the jury had accepted them, it would have been 
reasonable for the jury to find that the danger was open and obvious to Mr. Spahr on Question 1 
of the form, or alternatively that Mr. Spahr was over 50% at fault. And the jury was expressly 
instructed to, and in fact did on the verdict form, consider and quantify the extent of Mr. Spahr's 
own actions in causing the accident. 
And the evidence indeed reasonably supported the jury's nearly complete rejection of 
Ferber Resorts' arguments, which was reflected in the verdicts that the dangerous condition of 
the land was not open and obvious to Mr. Spahr and that he was only 1% at fault. As already 
mentioned, Mr. Spahr testified that he was not in total darkness and did not believe he was 
walking into it either. This testimony rebuts the arguments that the darkness alone was a known 
danger to Mr. Spahr and that he had some reason to seek out another route. Mr. Spahr also 
testified that he was walking on pavement immediately before he fell which the jury could have 
reasonably believed. Mr. Spahr further testified that he had not previously noticed the ditch into 
which he fell which the jury was also free to believe. 
In sum, Mr. Spahr presented evidence sufficient to support his contention that the 
dangerous condition at the Rodeway Inn was not open and obvious to him. He was therefore not 
precluded from claiming that Ferber Resorts owed him a legal duty of care. 
2. The Evidence Supports the Verdict for Loss of Consortium. 
Ferber Resorts asserts that Ms. Spahr did not prove a significant injury to Mr. Spahr 
sufficient to satisfy Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-11, the loss of consortium statute. Specifically, 
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Ferber Resorts contends that Ms. Spahr did not present evidence that Mr. Spahr was "paralyzed," 
that he had a "significant disfigurement," or that he was "incapable" of performing the types of 
jobs he did before the injury as required by § 30-2-1 l(l)(a). 
Mr. Spahr did not claim to have been paralyzed and no evidence was offered to support 
such an assertion. Ms. Spahr did, however, present evidence of scars on Mr. Spahr's knee, a fact 
that Ferber Resorts concedes. The most striking evidence was a photograph taken shortly after 
the injury showing massive and deep scarring. This photograph was received together with 
testimony that the scarring was at present slightly less pronounced than in the picture. There was 
further testimony that Mr. Spahr was ashamed to be seen in shorts because people might see the 
scarring to his knee. While neither party has cited any Utah authority establishing what exactly is 
required to show a "significant disfigurement" under § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(ii), the court is convinced 
that the extreme scarring to Mr. Spahr's knee reasonably meets that definition.3 
Moreover, there was evidence that Mr. Spahr was unable to perform key aspects of the 
types of jobs he did before the injury. For example, Ms. Spahr presented evidence that Mr. Spahr 
could not kneel to garden and could not climb ladders to engage in carpentry. Ferber Resorts 
contends that "incapability" in § 30-2-11(1 )(a)(iii) must be read literally, meaning that if Mr. 
Spahr has any possible means to perform jobs, he is capable of those jobs.4 Such a literal reading 
3
 The court is not convinced to the contrary by Stone v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 7 S.E.2d 
226, 227-29 (S.C. 1940), which is an extremely dated, non-Utah case interpreting the question of 
what was meant by "serious bodily disfigurement" under South Carolina's then-existing worker's 
compensation statute. 
4
 Ferber Resorts also contends that "jobs" must mean paid employment. There is nothing 
in the statute that compels that reading, and the word jobs is commonly understood to include 
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of the statute is not warranted by the face of the statute. Unless they are paralyzed (which is 
covered separately by § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(I)), resourceful people may often find new and inventive 
ways to accomplish many of the same jobs they did before injury. For example, Mr. Spahr may 
be able to garden laying down, or to buy a hydraulic lift to help him build ceilings or complete 
other jobs that would be normally done on a ladder. Rather than being literally and completely 
incapable of doing a job even in a most limited and extraordinary way, then, being unable to 
engage in an essential part of a job in a routine manner must suffice to make one incapable of 
performing that job under the statute. In this case, the evidence reasonably supported a finding 
by the jury that Mr. Spahr was incapable of performing many of the jobs he had done before the 
injury. It cannot be reasonably disputed that as a routine matter, gardening requires kneeling and 
carpentry requires climbing ladders. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Boyle v. Christensen, 219 P.3d 58, 63 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2009) does not persuade the court otherwise. In Boyle, the injured party admitted in his 
deposition that he had performed the same jobs after his injury that he had performed before his 
injury, albeit in "significant discomfort." Id. In that context, the Boyle court found that the party 
was capable of doing those jobs, noting that "the statute does not speak in terms of impairment, 
but, rather, 'incapacity.'" Id. (citing Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii). Here, the record 
supports a conclusion that Mr. Spahr is not simply in discomfort doing jobs he had done before, 
but is incapable of kneeling and climbing ladders. Accordingly, Ms. Spahr's claim does not 
hinge on an argument that he is impaired in his gardening and carpentry, but on proof that he is 
paid and unpaid pursuits. 
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altogether precluded from them.5 
For the above reasons, the evidence supports a finding by a reasonable jury that Mr. Spahr 
was either significantly disfigured, incapable of performing jobs he did before the injury, or both. 
Either of these findings supports the conclusion that Mr. Spahr was significantly injured as 
defined by the Utah loss of consortium statute. Accordingly, Ms. Spahr was not precluded as a 
matter of law from proceeding on her loss of consortium claim. 
B. New Trial or Remittitur under Rule 59 
Ferber Resorts argues that a new trial or remittitur should be granted for several reasons, 
all of which are broad and largely without objections made during the trial. First, it argues that 
no substantial evidence supported the amounts awarded by the jury. Next, it argues that the 
verdicts resulted from inappropriate and reversible passion, bias and/or prejudice stemming from 
the Spahrs' closing arguments. The court will address the Ferber Resorts' arguments below. 
1. The Size of the Non-economic Damage Awards is Not Excessive Given 
the Evidence Presented. 
Ferber Resorts contends that the size of the damage awards - about $393,000 in Mr. 
Spahr's favor and about $42,500 in Ms. Spahr's favor (both to be reduced by 1% due to Mr. 
Spahr's fault in the accident) - are either shocking to the judicial conscience or are so excessive 
as to "raise an irresistible inference of passion, prejudice or other improper cause." Blanke v. 
Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998). As a remedy, Ferber Resorts seeks either 
5
 Even if the court has improperly distinguished Boyle and a more correct reading of the 
statute would lead to the conclusion that Mr. Spahr is not incapable of performing these jobs, a 
straight forward reading of the statute makes clear that Ms. Spahr needed only to prove one of the 
three factors under § 30-2-1 l(l)(a)(I)-(iii). 
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remittitur of the awards or a new trial. 
Ferber Resorts' arguments are not well taken. Far from making a bare or unsupported 
assertion of non-economic damages, the Spahrs put on a great deal of evidence to support that 
claim. Mr. Spahr testified to the considerable pain, mental and emotional suffering and serious 
life consequences he has experience since his injury.6 Mr. Spahr described in detail the agony he 
suffered when he fell into a nearly six-foot concrete ditch in which he landed almost full-force on 
his knee. He testified that the fall was a complete surprise and that he had no opportunity to 
brace or otherwise protect himself from injury on impact. He recalled calling for help for 20 
minutes or more without any response and not knowing when he might be found. He explained 
that he had to stand on an injured leg to cry for help. He described having to devise a strategy to 
save his strength to maximize his chances of being rescued and not exhaust himself from yelling. 
He recounted having to hide his bloodied knee when he was finally pulled from the ditch so that 
his wife would not be overly traumatized by the sight of it. There was evidence that the long 
ambulance ride to the hospital was bumpy and painful for Mr. Spahr. There were photos of the 
injuries on Mr. Spahr's entire body from the fall, not limited to his knee. He presented evidence 
of the need for emergency surgery and the hospital stay afterwards. The painful and awkward 
6
 Oddly, Ferber Resorts cites Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 
1416 (10th Cir. 1997) to suggest that only "exceedingly graphic or detailed" testimony will 
support substantial non-economic damages. The court reads Smith as making clear that graphic 
or detailed testimony is not needed for such damages, especially when the totality of the 
circumstances is considered along with the testimony. See id. While Mr. Spahr was somewhat 
stoic during his testimony, the court does not believe that this stoicism compels a conclusion that 
the accident had an insignificant physical and emotional effect on him. In any event, the jury 
could reasonably find that Mr. Spahr gave detailed and graphic description of his injury. 
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multi-legged trip home from Utah to Nevada to Michigan was detailed. And there was evidence 
of the arduous, painful, and uncomfortable months-long period of recuperation and physical 
therapy. Mr. Spahr further put on evidence that he could expect pain, suffering, and a limited 
range of motion in his knee into the future. 
Mr. Spahr also detailed the effects of the injury on his personal life. There was evidence 
that the injury interfered and continues to interfere with the intimacy between the Spahrs. There 
was evidence that Mr. Spahr will no longer be able to garden or work as a carpenter. There was 
further evidence that he will be impaired or unable to do other activities that he was looking 
forward to in his retirement, such a water skiing, snow skiing, racquetball, jogging and hiking. 
The evidence was that Mr. Spahr enjoyed these activities before the injury and would no longer 
be able to engage in them. Indeed, the Spahrs were at the Rodeway Inn to hike in national parks. 
In light of the evidence that Mr. Spahr put on regarding his non-economic harm, the 
court's conscience is not shocked by the size of the award. While $393,000 is a considerable 
sum, it can hardly be called a windfall when one considers the evidence put on about the incident 
and its consequences. Moreover, while this figure is more than ten times the approximately 
$30,000 in medical bills that Mr. Spahr put on as evidence, there is no question that the injury 
was serious and extensive and required a significant period of recuperation. The law does not 
require a direct correlation between the evidence of the amount paid for medical care and the 
award for the total injury. The overall harm to the person, taking into account the impact it may 
have on all aspects of life, may significantly exceed the out-of-pocket costs for medical care. For 
all these reasons, the court does not believe the award to Mr. Spahr to be so excessive as to "raise 
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an irresistible inference of passion, prejudice or other improper cause." Blanke, 152 F.3d at 
1237. 
Likewise, Ms. Spahr put on ample evidence of the non-economic impact of the accident 
on her. She testified to the shock and trauma of being awakened by a stranger and then 
discovering Mr. Spahr visibly injured and in agony. She described having to take on unfamiliar 
responsibilities at a time of great stress. She detailed her own emotional pain at watching Mr. 
Spahr in physical and emotional pain and discomfort from the time of the accident until the 
present. She testified to her interrupted sleep, life, and work schedules while helping Mr. Spahr 
recuperate. She affirmed the negative impact on her intimate life with Mr. Spahr. And she 
described the loss of Mr. Spahr's companionship while she participates in activities that he is 
unable to do or finds too painful to enjoy. 
To be sure, $42,500 is a not an insignificant amount of money. But given the evidence 
that Ms. Spahr put on, it can hardly be said to shock the conscience. Moreover, while Ms. Spahr 
put on evidence of lost wages of only about $3,000, the impact of this accident was felt by Ms. 
Spahr in every aspect of her life, not just professional. The award to Ms. Spahr is thus not "so 
excessive as to raise an irresistible inference of passion, prejudice, or other improper cause." Id.1 
7
 The court agrees with the Spahrs that the facts and the figures in this case are strikingly 
similar to those in Blanke, in which the court upheld substantial non-economic damage awards. 
While Blanke gives a comfort level that the awards here are appropriate, the court is aware that 
each case must be considered on its own individual merits, and it has done so here. 
-13-
2. The Spahrs' Closing Argument, While Inappropriate or Inartful in 
Some Aspects, Did Not Unduly Prejudice Ferber Resorts. 
Ferber Resorts contends that the Spahrs' closing argument was so improper as to warrant 
a new trial. Ferber Resorts points to four main categories of argument that it maintains were 
improper: referring to matters out of evidence, advancing personal opinions of counsel, implying 
intentional malevolence by Ferber Resorts, and making improper references to Ferber Resorts' 
actions in defending this lawsuit. 
First, Ferber Resorts' complaint is procedurally flawed. It is well established that a party 
must bring to the attention of the court errors that can be corrected during the trial. Ferber 
Resorts objected only once to one line of argument during Spahrs' closing and the objection was 
immediately sustained. Ferber Resorts did not object to any other part of the closing and did not 
request a corrective instruction. Moreover, Ferber Resorts did not move for a mistrial based on 
the closing argument before this case was submitted to the jury. In Computer Systems. 
Engineering Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 69 (1st Cir. 1984), the courl ruled that a party's 
failure to object during close or to move for a mistrial barred the party from later "urging the 
improper argument as grounds for a new trial after the jury had returned its verdict." (citations 
omitted). The court reasoned that '"a party may not wait and see whether the verdict is favorable 
before deciding to object.'" Id. 
While the Spahrs do not cite a Tenth Circuit case in which a party was barred from 
requesting a new trial on these grounds, Computer Systems and its ruling was cited with approval 
in Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 1993). It is therefore 
probable that the Tenth Circuit would approve of the court following Computer Systems in this 
-14-
case. Accordingly, the court agrees with the Spahrs that Ferber Resorts' failure to object alone 
justifies the denial of this motion to the extent it is based on improper close. This is especially 
true in light of the fact that the one time Ferber Resorts did object, the objection was immediately 
sustained. 
Second, even if Ferber Resorts' failure to make timely objections or a motion for a 
mistrial does not preclude this motion, the court alternatively finds that any claims of impropriety 
in the closing did not, in context and in the totality of the argument, unfairly prejudice Ferber 
Resorts. Ferber Resorts fails to meet the relevant standards for the motion to prevail. In the 
Tenth Circuit, vacating a jury award and ordering a new trial on the basis of an inappropriate 
closing argument is an extreme remedy only to be granted in unusual cases. This proposition is 
made clear in Whittenburg v. Werner Enters. Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 2009), a case 
relied upon heavily by Ferber Resorts. In Whittenburg, the Tenth Circuit described itself as 
"reluctant" to order a new trial based on an improper closing argument. This reluctance would 
be unremarkable except for the fact that the Whittenburg court analyzed a closing argument that 
was blatantly improper in its entirety, since it compromised mostly of "fictitious admissions," 
and "vituperative and unprovoked attacks on defendants and their counsel" made with unusual 
"volume and volubility," that the impropriety continued "unrebuked despite contemporaneous 
objections" and that the impropriety had an "apparent influence" on the jury's verdict. Id. The 
Whittenburg court emphasized that it was only a "confluence of these three factors-the 
extensiveness of the improper remarks, the absence of any meaningful curative action, and the 
size of the verdict" that compelled the new trial in that case. Id. at 1133. 
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Put another way in another Tenth Circuit case, "even though an argument may be 
improper, a judgment will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the challenged remarks 
influenced the verdict." Lambert v. Midwest City Mem. Hosp. Auth., 671 F.2d 372, 375 (10th 
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Further, "[i]n applying this standard, we have consistently 
afforded trial counsel considerable leeway." Id. On the other hand, when "extraneous matter" is 
included in closing, the court must decide whether they had a "reasonable probability of 
influencing the jury." Id. (citation omitted). 
The Spahrs' closing arguments in a few instances crossed the sometimes fuzzy line 
between proper and improper. On occasion counsel spoke in terms that could have been 
understood by the jury to be his personal beliefs as to how the evidence should be viewed. But as 
a whole, the court is confident that the closing fell considerably and decisively short of the level 
of impropriety that would merit a new trial. Ferber Resorts' arguments otherwise, discussed 
below, are not persuasive. 
First, Ferber Resorts contends that the Spahrs made at least seventeen arguments based on 
matters not in the record. Before addressing any of these points specifically, it must be pointed 
out that the court gives weight to the fact that in this case, the jury was instructed that attorney 
argument is not evidence on two occasions: once before the opening statements and once before 
the closing arguments. The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that such instructions can mitigate the 
effects of references to matters not in evidence. See Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1131 ("[W]e have 
sometimes suggested that a general instruction at the close of trial, reminding the jury that 
counsels' arguments are not evidence, can help mitigate an improper closing argument.") 
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(citation omitted). Moreover, in the instructions given before closing arguments, the jury was 
told in Instruction 11 that "If any reference by the court or by the attorneys to matters of evidence 
does not coincide with your own recollection, it is your recollection which should control during 
your deliberations." Even further, the court provided each juror with a written copy of the jury 
instructions, including the instructions making clear that attorney argument is not evidence and 
that the jurors' recollection controls. The jurors were allowed to follow along on the written 
instructions while the court read them and to take their individual copies into the jury room. The 
court is thus satisfied that the jurors were well informed that they should ignore any allegations 
or argument that were not supported by the record and assumes that the jury understood that 
charge. 
Turning to the substance of the arguments, the court agrees with the Spahrs that many of 
the arguments that Ferber Resorts asserts are unsupported by the record were in fact "comments 
to evidence in the record and reasonable inferences from that evidence." Id. at 1125 (citations 
omitted). For example, the court agrees, after looking at pictures of the ditch as it existed at the 
time of the accident, the jury could reasonably infer that a child could have fallen into it. Making 
this argument did not require evidence that a child had actually done so. As another example, 
Ferber Resorts emphasized at various points in its examination and evidence presented during the 
trial the fact that Mr. Spahr had beer in his cooler at the time of the accident. It was also Ferber 
Resorts that elicited testimony from the officer who initially responded to the scene of the 
accident that the officer thought that Mr. Spahr must have been drunk to have fallen into such an 
obvious hazard. The Spahrs' attorney was thus justified in arguing that Ferber Resorts was trying 
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to portray Mr. Spahr as a "stumbling drunk," even if Ferber Resorts' attorney subjectively 
believes otherwise. Moreover, as to the several examples of the Spahrs' attorney arguing that 
Mr. Spahr would have lifelong pain, there was evidence that allowed the jury to infer that he 
would have such pain. 
Ferber Resorts also points to a few instances when the Spahrs' attorney argued that Ferber 
Resorts had viable alternatives to leaving the ditch and its surroundings in the condition they 
were in at the time of the accident and that blaming guests appeared to be a cheaper idea for 
Ferber Resorts. Ferber Resorts argues that the Spahrs should not have made such an argument 
because Ferber Resorts did not argue that it had no feasible alternatives. But Ferber Resorts cites 
no case law for the proposition that the defense must first raise an issue before the plaintiff can 
argue that was a reason for the defendant's action. Further, it is quite clear from the closing that 
it was the Spahrs attorney's theory only that Ferber Resorts believed blaming guests to be 
cheaper than fixing problems. As such, this contention was not portrayed as a fictitious 
admission by Ferber Resorts, as in the Whittenburg case, but rather as an opinion of the Spahrs' 
attorney. The expression of that personal opinion was not in good form, but it was a minor point 
in the overall argument and was not emphasized to the point that it should be concluded it 
improperly influenced the jury. 
To the extent that the Spahrs' attorney did a few times refer to matters that were not 
arguably supported by the record, the court finds that they were "minor aberrations" unlikely to 
have prejudiced the jury. Id. at 1128. For example, the Spahrs' attorney's references to the 
employer/employee relationship were obviously an analogy intended to explain the concept of 
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compensatory damages. Those references were thus not likely to have confused the jury or to 
have made the jury believe that Ferber Resorts employed Mr. Spahr. 
For all these reasons, the court finds that the arguments made in closing argument that 
Ferber Resorts characterized as references to matters not on the record were unlikely to have 
improperly influenced the jury. 
The next category of purportedly improper arguments are what Ferber Resorts 
characterizes as personal opinions of counsel, of which Ferber Resorts cites eight. First, the 
court acknowledges that some of the instances where Spahrs' counsel used the phrases "I think" 
and "it seems to me" were not in good form and counsel would be better advised to be more 
careful in his use of language. Nevertheless, in the context of the closing as a whole, it was clear 
that counsel was speaking in a colloquial sense and was not attempting to offer a personal 
assessment. Moreover, the court is baffled by Ferber Resorts' apparent contention that it is 
improper for counsel to make arguments about witness' credibility. That is exactly a purpose of 
closing. Calling his clients decent and honest, saying his expert is honest, and asserting that an 
opposing witness' testimony is not worth a hill of beans are precisely what the Spahrs' counsel 
was expected to do at closing. In zealously representing his clients, counsel could properly make 
those arguments. What would have been improper is for the Spahrs' counsel to purposely give 
the impression that he had formed a personal opinion based on information known to him but 
outside of the record. See, e.g., Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1130. But at no point during the 
closing did the court believe that counsel acted so outside of the leeway properly allowed to him 
to require a conclusion that he was trying to press his personal opinion on the jurors instead of 
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his passionate arguments on the case, nor is there any reason to believe that the jurors so 
understood the arguments. 
The third category of improper argument that Ferber Resorts identifies is allegations of 
intentional malevolence by Ferber Resorts. As Ferber Resorts points out, a suggestion by 
plaintiffs counsel that the defendant "acted with a degree of calculated intentional malevolence" 
is one that "has no foundation in [a] trial on negligence." Id. at 1129. In reviewing the nine 
instances of such conduct specified by Ferber Resorts, the thrust of most of the arguments is that 
Ferber Resorts is trying to escape responsibility for the safety of guests and the injury to Mr. 
Spahr.8 The court accepts that these arguments may have implied some level of malevolence by 
Ferber Resorts, which was improper in this negligence trial. But the prejudice that might have 
been caused by this line of argument did not rise to the level at which the court needs to start 
seriously considering a new trial. For example, in Whittenburg, not only did the plaintiff invent 
an admission by the defendant that the defendant was going to act recklessly and then relentlessly 
and cruelly attack the plaintiff to try to get out of it, but the jury was asked to put itself in the 
plaintiffs children's shoes in considering this admission. See id.9 
8
 There are also instances of appearing to disparage Ferber Resorts for defending this 
action, which are addressed below. 
9
 Moreover, the court observes that during Ferber Resorts' closing, its counsel did not 
always treat the Spahrs with a gentle touch either. For example, as the court recalls (though 
without referring to the transcript), Ferber Resorts' counsel argued that Mr. Spahr's decisions on 
the morning of the injury were alternatively idiotic, stupid and boneheaded. And none of these 
adjectives are needed to show simple negligence, which is simply failing to use reasonable care. 
Accordingly, Ferber Resorts's closing was not without some level of impropriety that was fair 
game for the Spahrs to "cancel out." Id at 1130. 
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The final type of argument Ferber Resorts identifies is the Spahrs' counsel appearing to 
disparage Ferber Resorts for defending this action, suggesting that Ferber Resorts' actions in 
defending the litigation are appropriately considered in the liability and damages analysis, and 
making other similar references to Ferber Resorts' actions in defending this action. This ground 
is Ferber Resorts' strongest, and is "especially concerning" to courts considering this type of 
motion. See id. at 1129. A defendant has a right to deny the plaintiffs allegations and to 
vigorously defend against the claims. Plaintiffs counsel cannot properly argue to the jury that a 
defendant acted improperly or that the jury should punish a defendant for doing so. But for the 
reasons discussed below, the court is convinced that to the extent the Spahrs' counsel engaged in 
these types of improper arguments, the level of impropriety was not significant enough to vacate 
the award here. 
First and most importantly, the court sustained Ferber Resorts' objection to the Spahrs' 
line of argument near the end of their closing that Ferber Resorts' actions in defending this suit 
harmed the Spahrs. These arguments were the most flagrantly improper and potentially 
influential ones that the Spahrs made. When Ferber Resorts' counsel objected to them, he gave 
as grounds that "this is going into conflated litigation difficulty with any sort of damages that are 
recoverable under tort law." (Trial Transcript, Dkt. No. 92-2 at Pages 30-31 of 36). The court 
sustained this objection, without any hesitation, without allowing argument by the Spahrs' 
counsel, and without qualifying counsel's description of the impropriety. Ferber Resorts did not 
request any corrective instruction. After the objection was sustained, the Spahrs' counsel again 
argued that a verdict in the Spahr's favor would restore their good name. But Ferber Resorts 
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failed to object or request any curative instruction to clarify what was wrong with the argument, 
nor did it move for a mistrial. 
If this particular line of argument had played out differently, Ferber Resorts might have a 
stronger case for a new trial. But unlike in Whittenburg, the court intervened to decisively stop 
improper argument immediately in response to Ferber Resorts' sole contemporaneous objection. 
Ferber Resorts sought no remedy to the potential prejudice beyond the granting of its objection, 
and the grounds stated for the sustained objection made clear that litigation difficulties are 
separate from tort damages. While the Spahrs' counsel again made reference to restoring the 
Spahrs' good name by granting judgment in their favor, the jury was put on notice by the 
objection that damage to one's reputation is not properly considered in deliberating on a 
negligence case. 
The other arguments of this type identified by Ferber Resorts were improper, but were not 
significant enough for the court to believe they had a likely influence on the jury. For example, 
when the Spahrs' counsel stated that he was irritated because it seemed that Ferber Resorts was 
exceeding the bounds of propriety, it was clear in the context of the trial that he was referring to 
his own agitated behavior on cross examining a defense witness. The suggestion that Ferber 
Resorts was behaving improperly was obviously attorney argument that the jury was instructed 
not to treat as fact. The Spahrs counsel's references to the number and costs of Ferber Resorts' 
experts were made in passing and may well have been evidence the jury was allowed to consider 
in considering what weight to give to their opinions. These references were therefore unlikely to 
have the effect of suggesting Ferber Resorts' wealth or reprehensibility in defending the action. 
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Id. at 1129-31. The court has reviewed the other instances identified by Ferber Resorts and is 
satisfied that they were unlikely to have influenced the jury. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For all of these reasons, Ferber Resorts' motion for judgment as a matter of law and for 
remittitur or a new trial is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 4th day of February, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
Clark Waddoups 
United States District Judge 
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